Louisiana Law Review
Volume 53
Number 6 July 1993

Article 5

7-1-1993

The Role of "Unilateral" Error in Contract Rescission, Construction,
and Damage Valuation: A Modest Proposal
David E. Redmann Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
David E. Redmann Jr., The Role of "Unilateral" Error in Contract Rescission, Construction, and Damage
Valuation: A Modest Proposal, 53 La. L. Rev. (1993)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol53/iss6/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

The Role of "Unilateral" Errorin Contract Rescission,
Construction, and Damage Valuation: A Modest Proposal

I. INTRODUCTION
The civil law in general, and Louisiana law in particular, have treated many
contract law problems in an intellectually accurate and evenhanded manner.
Although many cases would be decided the same way under either Louisiana law
or common law, the two systems treat "unilateral" error differently, both
theoretically and practically.' While at common law unilateral error regarding a
contract is often inconsequential,2 in Louisiana it can be the basis for rescission.'
Although a cursory inspection of the law might lead one to believe that error plays
a limited role in Louisiana contract law,4 this is not so. Many of the provisions
controlling the existence and construction of a contract, as well as the damages
available, implicate questions of error to a considerable extent. It is impossible to
apply properly these provisions without understanding the role of error and fault.
Contract law can only serve contracting parties to the extent that its theoretical
foundations reasonably reflect the typical conditions in which the parties operate. 5
Frequently theoretical evaluations of contract law fail to consider that in many
cases there is little or no mutual will because one or both parties have behaved in
a substandard manner. This theoretical gap could be filled by the following rule:
when the court cannot determine with any reason-able degree of certainty what the
parties actually intended or what their contract objectively means, the court should
attempt to resolve the dispute by considering the parties' respective fault causing
the misunderstanding.
When the court finds that there was no apparent agreement between the parties,
justice is best served by allocating any costs of the misunderstanding to the party
or parties who created it. Insofar as the parties share responsibility for the

Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
1. Other contract law differences include: Louisiana requires "cause" whereas the common
law requires "consideration"; and Louisiana law prefers specific performance, which the common law
disfavors.
2. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 (1981). The Restatement explains that,
among other requirements, a mistaken party may avoid the contract only when "(a) the effect of the
mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, or (b)the other party had
reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake."
3. La. Civ. Code arts. 1948-1952.
4. Only La. Civ. Code arts. 1948-1952 and 2057 specifically rely on it.
5. The traditional model of contracting might be characterized as: two parties, either
themselves sophisticated or represented by counsel, negotiate the terms on a give-and-take basis and
reduce the entire agreement to one written document. At least one author has averred (semihumorously) that the last time this happened was 1879. See James D. Gordon III, How Not to
Succeed it Law School, 100 Yale L.J. 1670, 1696 (1991). Although the point may be over-stated,
it is probably true that there are now more "contracts" which the parties enter after less than a full
bargaining and drafting process.
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misunderstanding, it isjust to allocate the costs of it to all of the responsible parties
in fault-based proportions. Thus,justice is furthered by applying fault and
comparative fault principles to contract cases in which the court cannot find that the
parties had any particular agreement or that the agreement they executed has any
particular meaning.
Besides promoting justice, the proposed rule will also increase the stability of
transactions, which is arguably as important as achieving just results. However,
when parties doubt the legal effects of their contract, three factors largely create this
doubt: the parties' own substandard conduct during the contracting process, the
courts' considerable discretion in contract disputes, and the Civil Code's contract
interpretation articles which do not lead invariably to one result. 6 The proposed
rule is in part suggested specifically to reduce instability caused by the first factor.
Moreover, it will also reduce instabilities arising from the law or the legal system.7
The party seeking contract rescission must prove: (1)the existence of his error;
(2) the bearing of that error on a principal cause of the contract;8 and (3) the other
party's knowledge that the subject of the alleged error concerned a principal
cause. 9 Once these are proven, the court nevertheless has considerable discretion
on whether to grant rescission. Likewise, the court has considerable discretion on
contract construction questions under the Civil Code's rules for "Interpretation of
Contracts.'" By unwittingly choosing among these articles, one can often justify
opposite results for the same contract. The court should consider the policies of the
law in such cases for two reasons: only by doing so can it achieve stability; and to
the extent that these articles can be ambiguous, the law requires the court to
consider the relevant policies."
For the court to use legal or other public policies in guiding its considerable
discretion, it must first determine exactly what those policies are. Under Louisiana
contract law, three questions reflect the policies on resolving contract disputes: (1)
what did the parties intend to bind themselves to do; 2 if the court cannot answer
the first question completely satisfactorily, (2) what does the best objective
interpretation of the contract require of the parties; 3 and, unable to clearly answer
one of the foregoing, (3) whose fault is it that the parties' intent14and their objective
manifestation thereof, usually a written contract, are unclear?
When the court cannot answer the first two questions satisfactorily, the court
should consider the role of error and fault in the contractual misunderstanding.

6. Although not truly contradictory, these articles could be misunderstood if applied out of
context. See infra parts IV-B and IV-C.
7. La. Civ. Code art. 1948.
8. La. Civ. Code arts. 1949, 1950.
9. La. Civ. Code art. 1949.
10. La. Civ. Code arts. 2045-2057. See infra parts IV-B and IV-C.
11. "When the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted
as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law." La. Civ. Code art. 10.
12. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 2045, 2048, 2051, 2052.
13. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 2046, 2047, 2049, 2050.
14. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 1952, 2056, 2057.
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When a misunderstanding exists, at least one party is in error, whether the error is
one legally sufficient to permit the court to grant rescission or not. Of course, not
all errors are caused by one or both parties' faulty conduct, but there are several
types of faulty conduct which regularly cause contractual misunderstandings, for
example: failing to contract in sufficiently specific and clear terms;'failing to
explain one's goals in contracting and one's understanding of the proposed contract
terms;'6 or failing to provide contractually for a reasonably foreseeable contingency. If the court resolves the dispute based on error or fault and both parties'
conduct is faulty, the only reasonable solution is to compare the fault of the parties
and allocate the costs of the misunderstanding in proportion to their respective
degrees of fault. Although not every misunderstanding or gap in contract terms is
caused by faulty behavior, nevertheless, when faulty behavior makes resolving the
dispute based on the parties' intent impossible, the court should allocate the costs
of the misunderstanding to any and all parties responsible for it.
Many attorneys seem to believe that any interjection of questions of fault into
contract law would invariably harm the stability of transactions. However, contract
law better serves contracting parties when it encourages them to be clear during the
contracting process. The more clear the contracting process and the contract
document are, the fewer the resulting misunderstandings and the less time and
money the parties lose because of these misunderstandings. The fuller use of faultbased principles in contract law as outlined above would promote both the stability
of transactions and justice.
II. BACKGROUND

It is a common misperception that contract law is a field in which theory is of
comparatively little importance. According to this inaccurate view, as long as the
law is clear and well-known it may be relied on and applied with nothing more
required. However, because the usefulness of contract law depends on the
continuing relevance of its theoretical foundations, it is beneficial to consider
briefly some of these underpinnings.
A contract is an agreement whereby the parties create, modify, or extinguish
legal duties to each other.' 7 Because it is an agreement, its existence and effects
depend on the will that the parties express. The parties can act on anything they

15. For example, one lawyer told me that he once reviewed a contract for the sale of
commodities between the United States and Canada. Although the contract specified the price in
"dollars," it was unclear whether American or Canadian dollars were intended. His client told him
to leave it ambiguous so that the client could urge whichever interpretation was more self-serving
when the time came for payment. This misunderstanding, though careless in origin, was perpetuated
deliberately. The law should discourage both negligent and intentional obscurity to increase stability
and to decrease transaction costs.
16. The exact amount of explanation necessary will be a fact-sensitive determination. The
contract's value, the transaction's regularity, and the parties' sophistication, among other things, are
relevant to this determination.
17. La. Civ. Code arts. 1756, 1906.
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agree to, but the utility of contract law lies in the parties' using it to order their
rights and duties in an enforceable way. As long as the parties agree, there is no
role for the coercive ability of the law. However, when the parties differ on
whether they ever agreed to anything, what they agreed to, or whether they have
met the agreement, they can use the legal system to resolve their dispute and
enforce their agreement."
When the parties use the legal system to resolve their dispute, it is generally
because they no longer agree as they previously believed they did. Although in
some cases one party may simply wish to ignore what he has agreed to do or may
be unable to fulfill the agreement, such cases present issues outside the scope of
this comment. In all other cases, the parties did not in fact fully agree. They may
have failed to understand each other on some essential point of the transaction, or
they may have agreed on the essential points of the matter but failed to consider
some other points. When they have reduced their agreement to writing, the written
contract may fail to show clearly either party's point of view, or it may show one's
point of view and not the other's. Nevertheless, one or both of the parties were
mistaken, or "in error," regarding the agreement. Although the parties in effect
agreed to be bound by a reasonable interpretation of their contract, problems arise
when no single interpretation of the contract is clearly more accurate than others.
In such cases, one or both may file suit to enforce the agreement through the legal
process.
The law must attempt to enforce the parties' agreement, regardless of how the
law ascertains what the agreement actually is. 9 Generally, the agreement will be
a written set of provisions. If the law were to accept, without question, one party's
assertion that he did not agree to the terms the other claimed, no agreement could
ever be enforced, and contract law would be useless. Therefore, the law must
attempt to determine the content of the parties' agreement.20 However, if one

18. "But when one party proposes, and the other assents, then the obligation [contract] is
complete, and by virtue of the right each has impliedly given to the other, either of them may call
for the aid of the law to enforce it [compel the other to perform his obligation]." La. Civ. Code art.
1803 (1870). This concept is recognized in other civil law jurisdictions. See, e.g., 2 Marcel Planiol
& George Ripert, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil 1165, Part I at 661 n.2 (Louisiana State Law
Institute trans. 1959):
It is certain that it is from the law that contracts derive their obligatory force, and that it
[the law] could refuse it [the force] to them; but the contracting parties obligate because
they want to, and if once concluded, the contract obligates each one of them in spite of
himself, it is because the public authority sanctions the contract.. This sanctioning role of
the law does not destroy the anterior role of the will of the parties; one must not confuse
the work of private wills, which determine the object and the extent of the promises made,
with the exterior coercion applied to this pact by the public authority.
19. There is the problem of parol evidence, i.e., what may be used to demonstrate what a
written document means. This is really a separate problem, and what is necessary to prove an
obligation is dealt with in La. Civ. Code arts. 1831-1853.
20. There are so-called "objective" and "subjective" theories of contract law. These theories
differ in their conclusions regarding whether a party's mental state or the outward manifestation
thereof is more important. Few would suggest that subjective considerations should control the
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party's interpretation of the agreement, though incorrect, occurred due to the
other's lack of care when making the agreement, it would cause few problems for
the law to refuse to enforce the agreement as understood by the party who misled
the other. If one is careless when making the agreement, he can hardly claim the
protection of the law in enforcing it.2t The law is useful when it enforces the will
of the careful; it could be unjust to enforce the will of the careless.
The method the law uses to determine whether and how it will enforce any
contract should be readily determinable beforehand, so that parties who wish to
contract will know what standards of conduct they must meet before the law will
enforce their agreements. Thus, explicit rules of law should set forth how the law
will decide cases. However, no rule can provide for every situation, and many
attempts to apply rules too literally will lead to unjust or absurd results. A rule of
law utilizing error analysis can provide increased flexibility to help law accommodate reality and achieve justice. While the rules should not be subverted in the
22
name of achieving the law's purpose,
they frequently must be applied with an
23
purpose.
understanding of their
Error, and the related concept of fault, are often thought of as principles
relevant solely to tort law. Conventional wisdom suggests that using tort law fault
concepts to regulate contractual disputes does a disservice to all involved parties
and promotes injustice by making the effect of contracts more uncertain and less
reliable. Indeed, it is more important for substantive contract law to be stable than
for it to be perfectly just. This is so because contracting parties are generally given
a high degree of freedom 24 and presumably can contract out of unwanted
provisions of the law. In a sense, the contracting parties devise their own justice
or law. On the other hand, tort law determines the rights and duties of parties who
have made no previous provisions for their conduct vis-a-vis each other. Thus, tort
law must be based on external rules, and not on ones created by the will of the
parties. Nevertheless, the use of error for contractual analysis is not a radical
proposal; indeed, it underlies many of the Civil Code's provisions. 5 Sometimes

results, but to deny their relevance would be to do violence to the freedom of will which the civil
law values. The concept of "unilateral" error, clearly mandated by the Civil Code, defines a limited
area of Louisiana contract law in which partly subjective factors play a part. See, e.g., I Saul
Litvinoff, Obligations § 135, at 223, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
21. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2057.
22. La. Civ. Code art. 9.
23. La. Civ. Code art. 10. See discussion infra parts IV-B and IV-C.
24. "Parties are free to contract for any object that is lawful, possible, and determined or
determinable." La. Civ. Code art. 1971. Although this provision concerns what parties may contract
about, the same spirit pervades rules on what interpretive provisions parties may stipulate. For
example, parties are generally free to stipulate which state's or nation's law will govern their contract.
See La. Civ. Code art. 3540 ("All other issues of conventional obligations are governed by the law
expressly chosen or clearly relied upon by the parties, except to the extent that law contravenes the
public policy of the state whose law would otherwise be applicable under Article 3537.").
25. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 1948-1952, 1954-1955 (contract formation in general), 20562057 (contract interpretation), 2301-2302, 2304-2306, 2308-23 10 (payment of a thing not due), 2443
(purchase of a thing already owned), 2452 (sale of another's thing), 2521-2531 (redhibition), 2662
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the court will be unable to determine the intent of the parties or will have to chose
between two competing and equally tenable assertions regarding that intent. In
such cases, judicious use of an error-, fault-, and comparative fault-based system
of adjudication could increase certainty and encourage settlement. This would
occur because the court could order remedies other than all-or-nothing ones in
which one party's version of the contract would frequently end up controlling the
contract's effects.
Another concern which defenders of traditional, somewhat doctrinaire
positions express is that it would pervert contract law to consider the parties'
subjective feelings instead of their objective manifestations. 26 Certainly it would
be a poor result not to protect a party who relied on the other party's objectively
clear actions. However, several factors, including the overall obligation of good
faith27 and the hostility to contracts of adhesion, 8 give courts a mechanism to
prevent one party from taking advantage of the other's inexperience or ignorance.
There is ample basis and opportunity for judges to inquire whether a party's error
is due more to passive unconcern or neglect, on the one hand, or reasonable
misapprehension, on the other. A party may make every reasonable effort to
express his intent when contracting, yet fail to communicate that intent to the other
party or incorporate it into the terms and conditions of the contract. Thus, a party
may be in error regarding the expressed meaning of a contract even after making
objectively reasonable expressions of intent.

III. ERROR AND FAULT RELATING TO THE FORMATION OF AND THE
EFFECTS ON THE EXISTENCE OF CONTRACTS

The area of Louisiana contract law in which the meaning of error is best
defined encompasses the most basic question: is there a legally enforceable
agreement between the parties? Louisiana law requires four elements before any
agreement can be considered an enforceable contract: parties with capacity to
contract, their consent to the contract, a lawful cause of the contract, and a
determined or determinable object of the contract.29 The element potentially
affected by error is consent; traditional contract law has sometimes defined consent

(exchange involving thing belonging to neither party).
26. See supra note 20.
27.

"Good faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor and the obligee in whatever pertains

to the obligation." La. Civ. Code art. 1759.
28. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2056, cmt. (c): "Under the Article, a contract of adhesion must
be interpreted against the party who prepared it."
29. La. Civ. Code arts. 1918, 1927, 1966, 1971. La. Civ. Code art. 1779 (1870) listed these
requirements succinctly: "Four requisites are necessary to the validity of acontract: 1. Parties legally
capable of contracting. 2. Their consent legally given. 3. A certain object, which forms the matter
of the agreement. 4. A lawful purpose." La. Civ. Code art. 1772 (1825) and La. Civ. Code art. 8

(1808) were essentially similar.
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as a "meeting of the minds" of the contracting parties. 30 If the parties do not agree
to the same essential terms at the same time, there is no contract.
A. The Standardfor Legally Binding Consent
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that even if there is an apparent manifestation of consent, that consent is not necessarily legally valid.3' Consent may be
defective because of error, fraud, or duress.32 Unlike at common law, the error
need not be mutual, i.e., both parties need not have the same misapprehension of
some material fact. 3 In Louisiana, all contracts require a lawful cause,34 which
is "the reason why a party obligates himself." 35 The party not in error need not
know of the error for the contract to be subject to rescission, but need only know
that the subject matter of the error was a cause without which the other party would
not have made the contract.36 At times this has been referred to, somewhat
misleadingly, as the principal cause.37

30. The idea that a contract involves a meeting of the minds is frequently mentioned, though
seldom fully explained, in American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Benglis Sash & Door Co. v. Leonards,
387 So. 2d 1171, 1172-73 (La. 1980), in which the court explained, "[Tihe parties can consent to buy
and to sell a certain thing for a reasonable price, and when they do, the contract of sale has been
perfected. The essential thing is that there be a meeting of the minds (as opposed to a disagreement)
as to price." In Bowsher v. Merck & Co., Inc., 460 U.S. 824, 864, 103 S. Ct. 1587, 1609 (1983),
Justice Blackmun wrote:
A contract, after all, is a meeting of the minds. Many factors may affect one party's
willingness to make an offer or the other party's willingness to accept it, but the vast
majority of these factors are not mentioned in the bargaining process and play no part in
the agreement ultimately reached.
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For an older discussion of this idea, see
Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co. of Baltimore, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 390, 401 (1850).
31. Consent may be legally invalid yet morally valid. For example, when a seventeen-year-old
person contracts, the contract may be annulled because of the legal incapacity of one party. That
party's consent was defective due to lack of capacity. However, such a party would be under a moral
obligation to abide by the terms of the contract if he in fact understood and consented to the
transaction. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 1762(2).
32. La. Civ. Code art. 1948.
33. La. Civ. Code art. 1949, cmt. (d) states that "it is not necessary-that the other party have
known of the mistake; it suffices that he knew or should have known that the matter affected by the
error was the reason that prompted the party in error to enter the contract."
34. La. Civ. Code art. 1966.
35. La. Civ. Code art. 1967.
36. La. Civ. Code arts. 1949, 1950. An example illustrating this rule is Article 1837 (1870):
"Thus, if intending to employ an architect of great eminence, the party addresses himself by mistake
to one of the same name [and of the same profession], who has [neither skill nor reputation], the
promise made to him for compensation is void .... " (The altered material reflects corrections of
the mistranslations of the French text.) The rule of Article 1837 (1870) was generalized and
incorporated into Article 1952 (1984), according to cmt. (a) to the latter article.
37. The requirement of "principal cause" comes from La. Civ. Code art. 1825 (1870) (and the
identical Article 1819 (1825)), which stated, "The error in the cause of a contract to have the effect
of invalidating it, must be on the principal cause, when there are several; this principal cause is called
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The provisions of the law may seem odd, at least initially, in that they seem to
depend on subjective factors. Louisiana Civil Code articles 1949 and 1950 state:
Art. 1949. Error vitiates consent
Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without which
the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause was known or
should have been known to the other party.
Art. 1950. Error that concerns cause
Error may concern a cause when it bears on the nature of the contract,
or the thing that is the contractual object or a substantial quality of that
thing, or the person or the qualities of the other party, or the law, or any
other circumstance that the parties regarded, or should have in good faith
have regarded, as a cause of the obligation.
The meaning of these articles, and the substantially similar ones which predated
them,38 is well settled. The articles require (1) the error be one which, had the
truth been known, the party in error would not have made the contract; and (2) the
party not in error knew or should have known that the subject matter of the error
was essential to the other party. When both of these requirements are met, the
consent of the party in error is vitiated, and the court may grant rescission based on
the lack of lawful consent.39 There is no requirement that the other party know of
the error itself.'
B. The Rationale for Error in Louisiana
The rationale for the lower standard (vis-a-vis the common-law)' required to
rescind the contract is not immediately clear. Why does it matter that the party not
in error knew that the subject of the error was essential to the other party when the
error itself was unknown? Is this simply a method of providing greater protection
for parties in error while still placing some limits on that protection?

the motive, and means that consideration without which the contract would not have been made."
The rule of Article 1825 (1870) was explicitly rewritten to indicate that, to permit rescission, the error
need only affect any cause (of which there need not be only one) without which the contract would
not have been made. This rule is consistent with prior jurisprudence. See La. Civ. Code arts. 19491950 and their comments.
38. The comments explain that Article 1948 restates Article 1819 (1870); Article 1949
articulates ideas from Articles 1823, 1825, and 1826 (1870); and Article 1950 restates principles from
Articles 1824-1846 (1870).
39. La. Civ. Code art. 1952 makes it clear that the granting of rescission is discretionary: "The

court may refuse rescission when the effective protection of the other party's interest requires that
the contract be upheld." The article also allows the court to grant damages to either party based on
the equities of the situation.
40. "Under this revised Article, it is not necessary that the other party have known of the
mistake... " La. Civ. Code art. 1949, cmt. (d). See also infra note 93.
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The best reason for this requirement is that, when one party is put on notice
that a given detail is essential to the other party, that party is required4 to exercise
reasonable care to see that the contract being contemplated does in fact embody that
essential detail. Thus, not only must a party not take advantage of the other's
inferior knowledge, 2 but that party must also make an effort to discover the
other's intent and attempt to satisfy it. When the party not in error was reasonably
apprised of what the other wanted, but made no effort to see that the other's want
was achieved by the contract, the party not in error has not truly fulfilled the
requirement of good faith and thus may lose the benefit of the contract through
.rescission. Rescission is a just remedy because the party "not in error" was
nevertheless partially at fault for its existence; only with this understanding 43can the
rationale of rescission for unilateral error be applied in its proper context.
C. The Jurisprudence
1. TraditionalCases GrantingRescission
The revised articles are in line with the greater weight ofjurisprudence. The
cases indicate the judiciary has not hesitated to rescind contracts for unilateral error
as defined above, although rescission may be accompanied by measures to protect
the other party. In GreaterEast Baton Rouge KOA, Inc. v. Lamar Corp.," Lamar,
an advertising company, contracted to remove and replace KOA's outdoor
advertising sign. The new sign which Lamar contracted to erect needed to meet
state requirements for sign spacing and Lamar needed to place another sign on
Reverend Henry Roan's property, which Lamar leased. Before the work was done,
the company discovered that the proposed location of the new sign (on Reverend
Roan's property) was in a state highway right-of-way.
[T]he trial court held that Lamar's principal motive was to place a sign on
the Reverend Roan's property that would be economically useful and
feasible to them as an advertising company. The court found that because
of the State's right of way they were not able to do it. We agree with the
45

court.

The placement of the new sign was a principal cause of the contract, and the court
held that rescission was the proper remedy for the error, i.e., that the proposed sign
locations were legally available.

41. The requirement originates in the general duty of good faith in La. Civ. Code art. 1759.
42. This occurs when the party knows of the error itself.
43. See also Saul Litvinoff, "Error" in the Civil Law, in Essays on the Civil Law of
Obligations 222, 266-69 (Joseph Dainow ed. 1969).
44. 481 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
45. Id. at 655.
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In NationalCompany v. Krider,46 homeowners contracted to have siding
installed on their house. Although they contracted to reduce the maintenance on
their house, they mistakenly believed that the underlying wood was to remain in
place. The court held that the error did, in fact, bear on a principal cause of the
contract:
While defendants were interested in eliminating maintenance, the
principal cause or motive here was the placing of aluminum siding on the
house, conditioned upon the work being done in a manner which would
retain all of the building's wooden materials. And there was a misunderstanding regarding the manner in which the work was to be done, an error
of fact as to what the factory directions stated, between defendants and
plaintiff's representative.47
The court therefore granted rescission.
This might seem to cause great mischief by allowing rescission of contracts
against parties who acted completely reasonably and fairly. However, the law
protects the interests of parties not in error by allowing courts to award damages to
the party not in error or refuse rescission when appropriate. 4' Furthermore, courts
have been ready to protect such parties when the party in error has 'brought about
the error through his own lack of due care. Frequently the question of whether
rescission for unilateral error will be granted turns on considerations of how
careless or faulty the conduct of the parties was. For example, the party in error
may have been careless in examining the contract and/or the party not in error may
have failed to explain himself or the contract sufficiently. When the recissionseeking party's carelessness or fault is very slight, the courts have granted recission.
2.

Cases in which Negligence or Faultof the Party in Errorwas a
Defense to an Actionfor Rescission

Courts have long refused to grant rescission for error when the error arose due
to the deficient conduct of the party in error.4 9 This rule dates back at least to
Wikoffv. Townsend.' The plaintiff sued for the price of a lot in New Orleans sold
to the defendants. The plaintiff told the defendants the size of the lot, but the
defendants believed that the lot consisted of all of the vacant ground in the area,

46. 150 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
47. Id. at 594.
48. La. Civ. Code art. 1952.
49. For a discussion of the evolution of this concept in French law, see Litvinoff, supra note
43, at 247-52. For an analysis of the Louisiana case law development of the concept, see Vernon
V. Palmer, Contractual Negligence in the Civil Law-The Evolution of a Defense to Actions for
Error, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 7-32 (1975). For a recent discussion and re-affirmation of this principle,
see Scott v. Bank of Coushatta, 512 So. 2d 356, 362-63 (La. 1987) (discussing result of lax banking
practices and resulting error induced in bank customer).
50. 7 Mart. (o.s.) 451 (La. 1820).
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including a thirty-foot-wide strip that was not for sale. The defendants pled that
they were in error concerning the extent of the lot. In rejecting their plea, the court
explained,
We do not think that this is an error which vitiates the contract. The
defendants understood they were purchasing a space of two hundred feet
in front: they knew, orat least must be supposed to have known, what
extent that was. If they wanted to satisfy themselves on that score, they
might have had it measured: but, if relying on their own judgment they
made any mistake, as to the real extent of the two hundred feet, they
cannot plead such a mistake as an excuse.5
The court thus refused rescission when the error was one which the party in error
(the buyer) could have easily prevented,
after having been correctly informed of the
2
lot's dimensions by the seller.'
Other venerable cases have reached substantially similar results. In Boullt v.
Sarpy,53 the court considered the effect of signing an instrument which one has not
read and stated that if "informed, as he must have been ... he-nevertheless-signed the note as such, and as signatures to an obligation are not mere ornaments, he
cannot justly expect to be relieved from the effects of his own act .... .", Many
cases have followed, which hold that contracting without making reasonable efforts
to learn of the contractual terms is inexcusable error, depending upon the parties
involved and the circumstances of the transactions."
More recently, the court in Allen v. Royale 16, Inc.' 6 considered an alleged
error concerning the articles of incorporation of a new company. A shareholder had
the opportunity to read and modify the articles, but waited four months to do so.
After a fight for control and an examination of the articles, the shareholder claimed

51. Id. at 452-53.
52. The facts raise the question: should the seller have known of the buyers' error? The
reported record shows that the court seems to have rejected the buyers'/defendants' contention that
the seller misled them or knew what they expected. Id. at 452.
53. 30 La. Ann. 494 (1878).
54. Id. at 495-96.
55. For a recent and especially strong example, see Bogalusa Community Medical Center v.
Batiste, 603 So. 2d 183 (La. App. IstCir. 1992). There, a widow signed a financial responsibility
form so that her (then living) husband could get medical treatment at the hospital where he was
employed. She claimed that she signed the form to begin treatment but had no intent to obligate
herself for the expenses. The court held that
[t]he law provides that a party to acontract is presumed to know its contents and cannot
avoid its obligations by contending that he did not read it, that it was not explained, or
that he did not understand it ....[T]he terms of the financial responsibility form clearly
obligate the guarantor to pay for the medical services rendered to the patient identified on
the form.
Id. at 186 (citations omitted). Thus, because the form itself was clear, the hospital did not owe Mrs.
Batiste any explanation, and her failure to discover the nature of what she was signing was aproduct
of her inexcusable fault.
56. 449 So. 2d 1365 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
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to be in error regarding the nature of the contract. The court held that "[o]ne who
signs a contract.., cannot avoid its provisions.., simply because he fails to read
or understand it .... Apparently the articles were drafted hastily, but there was
adequate time ... for Allen to read [them] and make any necessary changes or
correct errors. ' 5' The court refused to grant rescission because the error, if any,
.was inexcusable.
Likewise, rescission for error has been denied when the party in error did not
properly communicate the cause to the other party. In Shreveport Great Empire
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Chicoine, 8 a radio advertiser desired and expected a specific
number of speaking engagements as a result of his advertisements. The court held
that "[i]f the defendant required that such a provision be included in this
agreement, he was bound to make his wishes known to the plaintiff and to be sure
that the provision was included in the agreement. '59 Because the radio station
neither knew nor should have known of this cause, the contract was upheld.
When rescission has been denied, the justification is usually that the party in
error is to blame for the error. Although this may not quite be "fault" in the sense
that tort law uses the word, nonetheless the conduct of the party in error falls below
the standard of communication and investigation required by law, and thus the law
grants no remedy. In such a case, even though the party not in error may have
acted imperfectly, the party in error is primarily responsible for the error and
therefore suffers the consequences of it. In a sense, the court compares the fault of
the two parties and places the burden of the error on the party more responsible for
it. The law should not protect a party whose fault has allowed the error to occur,
at least when the other party is free of fault and would be harmed by rescission.
IV. ERROR AND FAULT REGARDING THE MEANING OF CONTRACTS
A. The Question of Construction in General
Just as the existence of a contract can be affected by error, the meaning of a
contract can be affected by an error concerning the effect of the contract or one of
its provisions. Two questions of contract law are essentially inseparable: first, is
there a contract, and second, what are the contract's terms? Theoretically, if the
parties do not agree on all essential terms, then there is no contract, in the sense that
a contract requires a meeting of the minds. Problems typically arise when the
parties fail to consider a given contingency or provide for a certain detail. Although
there is no meeting of the minds in the fullest and most traditional sense, both
parties behave (for a time, at least) as if there is a binding contract between them.
Any rule requiring that there must be a complete meeting of the minds is not
practical for many modern contracts. Frequently it would be unfair to rescind a

57.

Id. at 1368.

58.
59.

528 So. 2d 633 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
Id. at 637.
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contract merely because the parties had a trivial misunderstanding. In Louisiana,
6
a court may rescind a contract only for an error affecting a principal cause, 0i.e.,
a cause without which the contract would not have been made. When the
misunderstanding (error) affects some other matter, rescission is not possible, and
the court must attempt to interpret the contract and enforce it as interpreted. Thus,
many disputes involving contract interpretation are cases of error, but either the
error is legally insufficient to permit rescission or the parties want to retain the
contract no matter which way the dispute is resolved.
When the misunderstanding or error is not so critical as to make rescission
possible, 6' the court should use Louisiana Civil Code articles 2045-205762 to aid
in contract construction. These articles seem to present rules which are either
counter-intuitive or contradictory because the law necessitates principles for
contract construction which deviate considerably from the principles used in
ordinary textual interpretation. However, this misconception usually occurs when
the articles are considered outside of the framework in which they properly operate;
the proper framework is one which considers error and fault of the parties when
construing the contract. Ideally, the court, when interpreting a given contract,
should ascertain the common intent of the parties. 63 However, if the contract is
ambiguous, the court's task, to discover the common intent of the parties, proves
impossible. When the contract language does not make one interpretation
significantly more likely than another, Articles 2045-2057 place the burden of
contractual misunderstandings on the party who could have better avoided them
initially. Moreover, they seek to further equity and prevent one party from gaining
a windfall at the other's expense.
Although attorneys may be troubled by the idea that courts should decide
contract disputes by comparing the fault of the parties, that notion is neither as
radical nor as dangerous as it seems. The jurisprudence is replete with examples
of cases in which the court examined the circumstances, considered the opportunity
each party had to prevent the misunderstanding, and resolved the dispute in favor
of the party who had less opportunity to prevent the misunderstanding. 64 The

60. See supra note 37.
61.
In other words, when it does not bear on a cause without which the party in error would
not have contracted.
62. These articles state that interpretation is determining common intent (La. Civ. Code art.
2045); no search for intent is allowed when the written meaning is clear (La. Civ. Code art. 2046);

words must be given their general meaning unless they are technical words (La. Civ. Code art. 2047);
words should be interpreted in light of the object of the contract (La. Civ. Code art. 2048); etc. See
also Soverign Insurance Co. v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 488 So. 2d 982 (La. 1986) (comparing the
contract construction articles as revised in 1984 with the previous articles).
63. "Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties." La.
Civ. Code art. 2045.
64. See, e.g., Williams Engineering, Inc. v. Goodyear, 480 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985),
aft'd 496 So. 2d 1012 (1986); Larriviere v. Roy Young, Inc., 333 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976); Rozas v. Evangeline Parish Policy Jury, 322 So. 2d 403 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Fire
Protection Equipment Co. v. Rabinowitz, 194 So. 733 (La. App. Orl. 1940). The first three cases are
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notion of fault, then, can be a good predictor of results.65 As a general proposition, if one party causes a misunderstanding because of his faulty conduct, he
should pay the costs thereby incurred. However, it would be unwise to give courts
complete discretion to determine which party is more responsible for a given
misunderstanding. Guidelines are needed, and the present articles' provide some
very helpful principles. Both justice and the security of transactions will be better
protected by having courts place the burden of a contractual misunderstanding on
the party most responsible for it when the contract does not otherwise show a clear
common intent of the parties. This principle can be derived from a proper and
informed understanding of the present contract construction articles.
B. Disputes Concerningthe Effect of a ContractualProvision
The rules of contract interpretation contained in Articles 2045-2057 are not
exact formulae for reaching any result. Different rules may seem to suggest
opposite constructions of any given contract, or constructions which are counterintuitive. Applying the Civil Code articles is not very helpful unless the court
understands that they contain factors to be weighed in a broader legal framework.
They are simply factors which help the court answer two questions: what did the
parties probably intend and who is more responsible for any lack of common
intent?
As an example of when uninformed application of an article leads to seemingly
counter-intuitive results, consider Article 2056: "In case of doubt that cannot be
otherwise resolved, a provision in a contract must be interpreted against the party
who furnished its text. A contract executed in a standard form of one party must
be interpreted, in case of doubt, in favor of the other party." This provision is
neither new nor unique to Louisiana. 67 The reason this article might seem
counter-intuitive is that in most contexts, when one wishes to discover the meaning
of a document, the best authority to consult is its author. One would not ask the
author what he means and then conclude that the document means the opposite.
The question is usually what the author means and not what the document means,

discussed infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
65. There seems to be a strong correlation between being more at fault and being assessed the
burden of that fault by the court. However, that correlation is not perfectly causal, or at least it
should not be. Contract law demands as much certainty as possible while achieving reasonably just
results, and therefore rules are necessary. Decisions should be based on application of the Civil
Code's rules and informed by the reason for the rules. Stated differently, a case is decided because
of the rules, not because of the fault for the misunderstanding. The relation is not causal, but the
correlation is strong. An understanding of the role of fault provides a context for interpreting the
rules but it does not control such interpretation.
66. La. Civ. Code arts. 2045-2057.
67. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981) ("In choosing among the
reasonable meanings of apromise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred
which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise
proceeds.").
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because in non-adversarial contexts the only purpose of the document is to show
what the author thinks and means. In such cases the usual understanding is either
that the document has no meaning of its own other than what the author intends, or
that the meaning of the document itself is unimportant insofar as the document is
a necessary evil in facilitating a mental connection or "meeting of the minds"
between the author and the reader. In most cases the document is understood to be
an imperfect method of communicating ideas and not an idea in itself, and thus its
value is entirely in the reader's ability to determine from it the author's ideas.
However, contract law uses the convenient fiction that the document itself has
intrinsic meaning. This fiction is necessary, of course, because without it there
would be no objectivity and thus no stability in contracts.6' If a court asked the
author (drafter) of a contract what the contract means, the author could always give
a self-serving answer, thus destroying the stability of the contract. This stability is
absolutely necessary for the contract to be a useful device. Necessity, however, has
not generally been sufficient grounds for a legal rule. 6 9 The rule that provisions
are construed strictly against the drafter is justified because the drafter had the
opportunity to prevent ambiguities from occurring. Thus, the failure to use precise
language is in a sense faulty, and the drafter therefore properly bears the burden of
the contractual misunderstanding he created.
C. Constructionof Seemingly Conflicting Civil Code Articles
The contract construction articles themselves can seem to dictate contradictory
results when one attempts to apply them without considering the underlying

68. It is technically true that words and documents have no meaning other than what people
ascribe to them, in the sense that cultures ascribe ideas to sounds. However, the law necessitates that
the apparent, or objective, meaning controls the effect of the documents. Thus, barring unusual
circumstances, parties should not be allowed to assert that contractual meaning is other than what the
terms of the contract are reasonably understood to mean according to common usage or, where
appropriate, trade usage. Otherwise, courts would be free to do whatever they feel is just, without
giving proper deference to what the parties clearly express. For a gross abuse of a court's power in
this way, see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641
(Cal. 1968). Chief Justice Roger Traynor stated that "[s]ome courts have expressed the opinion that
contractual obligations are created by the mere use of certain words ... [and] flow, not from the
intention of the parties but from the fact that they used certain magic words." Id. at 644. He
construed a contract stating that the defendant would "'indemnify' plaintiff 'against all loss, damage,
expense and liability resulting from * * * injury to property, arising out of or in any way connected
with the performance of this contract."' Id. at 643. The court held that this contract would be
construed to mean that only third parties' property, and not the plaintiff's, would be covered by the
indemnity provision. The court admitted parol evidence, overturned the trial court's determination
that the plain meaning of the contract clearly supported the plaintiff, and remanded for a new trial.
Id. at 646-47. The problem with this case is that the court was unwilling to give the reasonable
construction to the contract.
69. Consider that some objectives of law may be unattainable. If the only way to stop the high
rate of drug use in the United States requires suspending the Bill of Rights, most would agree that
is too high a price to pay. A proper objective of law is frustrated because achieving it would entail
sacrificing higher legal values.
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principles. The articles must be viewed as simply the legally ordained factors to
weigh in the totality of the circumstances, because in many cases multiple articles
can be cited, each of which could suggest a different result if considered in a
vacuum. Moreover, the articles are the written distillations of the more general
principles of contract law, not the general principles themselves. This is done to
provide more concrete help in construing contracts than any general statement
could provide. However, the general principles are still important and should still
be consulted when the specific rules do not clearly dictate one result. It is
frequently forgotten that the Civil Code is an almost organic whole and that its
provisions must be interpreted and applied in light of each other.70 For example,
Articles 2049 and 2057 could be used by opposing sides to justify opposite results.
They state:
Article 2049. Provision susceptible of different meanings
A provision susceptible of different meanings must be interpreted
with a meaning that renders it effective and not with one that renders it
ineffective.
Article 2057. Contract interpreted in favor of obligor
In case of doubt that cannot be otherwise resolved, a contract must be
interpreted against the obligee and in favor of the obligor of a particular
obligation.
Yet, if the doubt arises from lack of a necessary explanation that one
party should have given, or from negligence or fault of one party, the
contract must be interpreted in a manner favorable to the other party
whether obligee or obligor.
When the contractual provision in dispute would be effective mainly against the
obligor, Article 20497' and the general rule in the first paragraph of Article 2057
would seem to dictate opposite results. The provision could be construed to give
it substantial effect (in accordance with Article 2049) and thus to place a greater
burden on the obligor (contrary to Article 2057), or to have a minimal effect
(contrary to Article 2049) and place a lesser burden on the obligor (in accordance
with Article 2057). However, the second paragraph of Article 2057 gives the rule
for resolving the conflict: the party responsible for the misunderstanding (if either
can properly be charged with it) bears the burden which the misunderstanding

70. "Laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other." La. Civ.
Code art. 13. "What is meant by the term 'code' as we use it here is to designate an analytical and
logical statement of general principles of law to be applied by deduction to specific cases and
extended by analogy [to others] .... " John H. Tucker, Jr., Forward to Louisiana Civil Code xxi
(A.N. Yiannopoulos ed., West 1993).
71. The rule is much older than the present article. See M'Micken v. Stewart, 10 Mart. (o.s.)
571, 575 (La. 1822), for application of the same rule from La. Civ. Code art. 57 (1808), which came
from Code Napoleon art. 1157 and was retained as La. Civ. Code arts. 1946 (1825) and 1951 (1870).
For a more recent application of the rule, see American Bank & Trust v. Wetland Workover Inc.. 523
So. 2d 942, 945 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 282, 283 (1988).
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creates. Thus, at least in this case, the role of error or fault is explicitly defined.
Indeed, the use of the words "negligence" and "fault" immediately call to mind the
tort principles expressed in Articles 2315-2324.2.
For example, suppose an eccentric gentleman were to bring his llama to a fine
clothing store. At the store he contracted to have the store's artisans provide the
llama with a wool suit for $1,950, a custom made llama hat for $250, and shoes for
$625. The suit and the hat specified in the contract were made according to
sketches in the contract, and the gentleman was delighted. However, when the
gentleman brought his llama in to have its shoes fitted, he was greatly disappointed.
Unlike the suit and hat, no sketch had been made of the desired shoes. The
gentleman had expected fine leather boots, but the shoes offered were merely
modified horseshoes, though of obviously high quality. The gentleman promptly
contacted his attorneys, demanding that they use all legal mischief at their disposal
to procure for him proper shoes for his prized llama.
The gentleman's attorneys might well argue that, according to Article 2050,
the provisions of the contract "must be interpreted in light of the other provisions
so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole." Thus,
because the gentleman obviously contracted' for fine (and expensive) clothing for
his llama, the contract must be construed to require equally fine (and expensive)
shoes for the llama. On the other hand, the attorneys for the clothiers might well
argue that according to Article 2047, "The words of a contract must be given their
generally prevailing meaning." Thus, they might plead, because the contract makes
no specifications regarding the shoes, the clothier-obligors should be allowed to
provide shoes such as are ordinarily made for large quadrupeds such as horses.
Moreover, because they already incurred considerable expense having a master
blacksmith in another state make special llama shoes and having these shoes
brought in by courier, they have provided what would normally be expected for
llama shoes and cannot be compelled to do more, at least not without a very
specific contractual provision demanding so. There is merit in both positions, and
specific articles, when considered by themselves, seem to dictate that each side
should win! The proper result in such a case should turn on the care each party
exercised, as a factual determination of the trial court, in specifying the object of
the contract. The gentleman may have clearly indicated that he wanted something
special or he may have been silent, leaving the clothiers to assume that he required
special shoes. In any case, the court should protect the party not responsible for the
misunderstanding.72
Although the second paragraph of Article 2057 is the only explicit mention of
this error or fault concept in the interpretation articles, meaningful use of the
articles requires that the court apply the articles only insofar as they help answer the
two key questions; namely, what was the parties' common intent and which party,

72. The above example, while unlikely in its particulars, illustrates what may go wrong in a
myriad of daily transactions. The odd circumstances are useful to avoid preconceived notions about
the proper result which may exist for more common transactions.
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if the contract is ambiguous, is responsible for the ambiguity? Indeed, if the words
of a contract are given their generally prevailing meaning, 73 the interpretation of
the contract might conflict with the prior conduct of the parties. 74 One could
devise many other examples of situations creating an apparent conflict in the
articles. Each article lists a factor which, in the absence of other factors, the court
must follow when construing contracts. 75 However, when a variety of factors
makes use of the articles as hard-and-fast rules difficult, the court must decide the
case in accord with the purpose of the law,76 which is to place the burden for a
contractual misunderstanding on the party more responsible for it.
D. JurisprudenceRecognizing the Role of Error and Fault
In the above examples, the proper analysis of each case uses fault, but only as
a guide for interpreting the Civil Code's rules, not as a controlling rule of law. The
rules of contract law are in one sense more like those of intentional tort law, even
though the relevant consideration is more like a negligence analysis. As in
intentional tort law, the rights and duties of the parties are relatively well-defined,
and arguments based merely on the fault of the parties should not control the
result.77 However, the rules themselves cannot resolve all conflicts, and by
properly considering the rationale behind the rules, courts can decide doubtful cases
more fairly.
This methodology has been used many times in Louisiana. In Vizinat v.
TranscontinentalGas Pipeline Corp.,78 the defendant wanted to traverse the
plaintiff's land to work on a pipeline. Because the plaintiff demanded an initial
payment for the use of his property, the parties executed a "damage release" which
gave the plaintiff $4,185 for "full settlement and discharge of any and all claims or
demands which the undersigned now have (has) for all ... damage... incurred by
reason of [the company's actions]."79 The defendants caused considerable
damage to the plaintiffs property and refused to pay more than was indicated by
the release. The defendant argued that the release was intended to cover whatever
damage would occur, as there had been none when the plaintiff signed the release.
However, the court was swayed by the fact that the defendant used a standard
release form. The court explained the rule:

73. La. Civ. Code art. 2047.
74. La. Civ. Code an. 2053.
75. La. Civ. Code art. 9.
76. La. Civ. Code art. 10.
77. For example, theoretically one can recover from another for a battery by proving an
unconsented-to touching, even if the touching did not cause serious injury. "Reasonableness" is not
the relevant standard. In contract law, one can recover for a breach of a contract without showing
that the other party acted unreasonably; the parties' mutual duties, while not absolute, are relatively
well defined, and thus the parties must do more than act reasonably.
78. 552 So. 2d 1237 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989), writ denied, 558 So. 2d 586 1990).
79. Id. at 1238.
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The agreement signed by the parties to this matter was a standard form
contract provided by Transcontinental. The contract is ambiguous, in light
of the circumstances, as to what it intends to compensate Mr. Vizinat for,
since no damages had as yet occurred. However, any ambiguities in a
standard form contract must be interpreted against the party who provided
it and in favor of the other party."
The court recognized that the dispute arose because the defendant had provided a
form contract instead of one written for the circumstances. Use of it created the
misunderstanding, and thus the defendant was in a sense at fault. The court held
that the contract did not preclude recovery of damages the plaintiff sustained after
it was signed; consequently, the court affirmed part of the trial court's award. 8
The rule from Article 2057, that failure to explain any relevant matter
reasonably in need of explanation is a ground for the court to construe a contract
against the failing party, is consistent with both the questions of which party is at
fault for a misunderstanding and whether the party acted in good faith. In Williams
Engineering,Inc. v. Goodyear,8" the court held that "[s]ince Robert Williams is the
expert and also drew up both contracts, it is our opinion that he had a duty to clarify
the effect of the oral change on the written contract terms."8 3 The court reached
a similar result in Larrivierev. Roy Young, Inc.84 and held, "Where a layman
contracts with a knowledgeable and experienced businessman, the burden is on the
latter to point out obscurity. To fulfill the burden on the experienced contractor in
dealing with laymen, he should point to the inadequacy of the layman's instructions."'" The court realized that the experienced party had the greater ability to
avoid the misunderstanding and, combined with the duty of good faith, the
circumstances dictated that the result be affected accordingly. Present Articles
175986 and 2057 should work together to produce the same result.

80. Id. at 1239.
81. Id. at 1240. There was a reversal in part because the court found that part of the claimed
damages had not been sufficiently proven. Id.
82. 480 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985), aft'd, 496 So.'2d 1012 (1986).
83. Id. at 778. The court cited La. Civ. Code art. 1957 (1871). It seems that the imprecise
language of Article 1957 (1870), which apparently changed the rule of Article 1952 (1825), caused
the legislature to reverse the apparent meaning (from "in favor of' to "against him who has
contracted the obligation") of the article in 1871. By "him who has contracted the obligation," did
the legislature mean the obligor, who contracted to perform the obligation, or obligee, who contracted
to secure the obligation's performance? I believe (but cannot prove) that the legislature intended to
create a rule consistent with both current Articles 2056 and 2057. The rule seems to have come from
a careless rewrite of Article 62 (1808) (which came from Code Napoleon art. 1162), which has the
same meaning as present Article 2057.
84. 333 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
85. Id. at 255.
86. La. Civ. Code art. 1759 states: "Good faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor and the
obligee in whatever pertains to the obligation."
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In spite of all this, an unsophisticated party cannot prevail when that party's
cause or causes are not communicated. In Rozas v. Evangeline ParishPolice
Jury,87 the court made it clear that the duty to explain in Article 1958 (1870)88
applies both ways. The plaintiff wanted very specific actions taken, but he did not
make his requirements known. Mr. Rozas allowed the Police Jury to dredge Bayou
Doza, which ran through his property, but he demanded that the spoils (the mud
dredged up) be spread out so that the property would remain essentially level. The
court held,
Arthur L. Rozas was the contracting party who desired the spoils spread
in a certain way. The burden was therefore upon him to explain clearly
what he wanted. The evidence indicates the obscurity in the contract
arose because he failed to convey his wishes to the Police Jury; hence, the
construction most favorable to the Police Jury must be adopted. 9
From this case it is clear that the burden of communicating one's desires is not only
on the more sophisticated party. Each party must make reasonable attempts to
communicate the desired terms of the contract. The burden on more sophisticated
parties is simply to refrain from taking advantage of the other's inexperience. This
case properly places the burden of the misunderstanding on the party most at fault
for creating the misunderstanding.
All parties to a contract are required to express themselves clearly. This rule
applies to sophisticated parties, who, when contracting with unsophisticated parties,
should explain what the average layman would need explained and point out
provisions which differ from what the average layman would expect them to mean.
It also applies to unsophisticated parties, who should make their desires explicit,
with more explicit instructions for more unconventional desires or requirements.
Failure to express oneself is legally deficient conduct which may result in an error
and the corresponding action for rescission or a contract construction dispute. The
only important difference is that rescission is only available for misunderstandings
regarding essential terms but any misunderstanding can result in a contract
construction dispute. Courts sometimes do and usually should consider the failure
to make oneself clear as a basis to burden the inarticulate party with the costs of the
misunderstanding thereby created. In these cases, the courts' decisions were
completely consistent with the articles in the Civil Code. The holdings are not
based on some unprincipled (in the sense of not based on positive law) judicial
discretion. They represent the achievement of that important goal of Louisiana law,
namely, that cases should be decided not only in accordance with the text of the
law, but also in harmony with the purpose of the law. This best serves both
stability and justice.

87.
88.
similar.
89.

322 So. 2d 403 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
The same result should apply under present La. Civ. Code art. 2057, which is substantially
Rozas, 322 So. 2d at 404.
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V. ERROR AS A BASIS FOR DAMAGES AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

A. The Problem of Selecting Remedies
When this existence or meaning of a contract is affected by error, the court
must also determine what effect the error will have and what remedies the court
will order. It is convenient for a court to find that an instrtiment is a valid contract,
interpret it as well as possible, and then order full compliance with the court's
interpretation of the terms. When this is done correctly, the court merely enforces
the prior will of the parties. Thus, the court need not attempt to determine what is
equitable, but only what was intended; the court's task is relatively simple.
When the common will of the parties is expressed in the contract, it is very
important for the court to enforce it. If courts were to resolve contract disputes by
making judgments on what would be "just" to both parties, the value of the contract
as an institution would be almost destroyed. What may seem unfair to a court may
have seemed completely fair to the parties when they contracted; furthermore, in
most cases, the parties will have had superior knowledge, compared to the court,
about the true value and burden of the contract. Moreover, an apparent injustice
may result as a natural consequence of a contract's consensual allocation of risk.
Generally, courts enforce all but the most egregiously unfair contracts. 90 If they
were to stop doing so, parties could not secure a future advantage, and there would
be no stability of transactions. Modern life would become more burdensome.
In many cases, however, there is either a lack of consent to the contract or a
lack of common will or understanding on the effect of the contract. These muddled
circumstances present the more difficult cases because the court cannot simply
enforce the common will of the parties; indeed, there is no common will to enforce.
The court must fashion a-remedy based on law and equity. If the behavior of one
party was sufficiently faulty and justice requires that the other obtain the full
advantage of the contract, the court may (and usually should) require specific
performance in favor of the other party. 9' However, specific performance, though
favored by the civil law,92 is not always the lawfully decreed remedy. In many
cases, courts may award damages instead of ordering a reluctant party to perform
half-heartedly.
When one party is in error which vitiates consent, Article 1952 gives the court
discretion: (1) to grant specific performance, and (2) to grant damages to
whichever party was adversely affected by the first decision. Furthermore, some
decisions have recognized a limited right of a party to whom rescission is granted
to recover damages from the other party. 93 Thus, the court has discretion to

90. In some limited circumstances, enforcing the contract may do more harm than good. Thus,
a contract to commit a crime is never enforceable. La. Civ. Code arts. 1966, 1968, 1971.
91. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1986-1988 and their comments.
92. La. Civ. Code art. 1986 and the comments thereto.
93. This is true unless the party not in error knew or should have known of the error itself.
La. Civ. Code art. 1952. In that case, the party not in error has committed fraud. "At civil law, a
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protect the party not in error by granting damages based on his reliance interest.'
If the party not in error can only be protected by specific performance, the party in
error may be awarded damages so that the other may not profit unjustly from the
error.9" When no true contract exists because of the error, the court has the power
to fashion remedies which can, as nearly as possible, 96 place the parties in their
initial position. Article 1952 gives the court discretion to reach very equitable
results.
B. Is there ComparativeFaultfor ContractRemedy Determination?
While in many cases of error only one party's conduct is legally deficient,
there are many others in which both parties' fault contributed to the error. The
results which Article 1952 achieves for cases of rescission (error in formation) only
settle part of the problem. When a legally enforceable contract exists, but there is
a dispute about its terms, other problems arise. Under Article 2057, if the
misunderstanding is chargeable to the negligence of one party, the contract is
interpreted in favor of the other. However, a contract may not contain an explicit
provision for the case, almost certainly common in real-world transactions, when
both parties have been at least somewhat negligent in making the contract. Do
Louisiana Civil Code articles 1952, 2057, and 23239' work together to dictate that
when both parties have negligently explained their positions on the same provision,
comparative fault shall be used in computation of damages?
The idea that comparative fault should control certain contractual disputes
predates the revision of the obligations articles in 1984.98 However, the adoption
of tort comparative fault in 1979' and the revision give additional support to the
view that, in limited circumstances, comparative fault should determine damages.

party's knowledge of the other's error at the time of making the contract constitutes fraud (dol).
La. Civ. Code art. 1949, cmt. (d). For cases granting rescission and damages, see infra note 113 and
accompanying text.
94. La. Civ. Code art. 1952, cmt. (c).
95. La. Civ. Code art. 1952; cmt. (e). For a case following this rule but decided before the
article was enacted, see Myles v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 375 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1979).
96. Insofar as the error is amisunderstanding which costs the parties
time and money, the party
in error should bear this loss. Even if the error occurred without the party being at fault, it would
be even more unjust to impose the cost of the error on the party who was not in error, i.e., who was
"correct."
97. Article 1952 gives the court great discretion on granting rescission and damages; Article
2057 places the burden of an unclear contract provision on the party who, by lack of necessary
explanation of negligence, caused a misunderstanding; and Article 2323 requires that, when
negligence is compared, any recovery for it is reduced by the portion of fault attributable to the
recovering party.
98. For a thorough analysis of the articles and cases prior to the revision, see generally Palmer,
supra note 49. Professor Palmer suggests that reliance damages might be apportioned or reduced on
the basis of comparative fault. Id. at 43-44.
99. La. Civ. Code art. 2323, as amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 431, § 1.
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Louisiana Civil Code article 2057 states that "if the doubt arises from lack of a
necessary explanation that one party should have given, or from negligence or fault
of one party, the contract must be interpreted in a manner favorable to the other
party . . . ." If both parties were negligent or failed to explain themselves, what
should the court do? It could simply refuse to take any action, thereby leaving the
parties as they were when the suit was filed. This practice, however, would
probably produce many injustices. If one party's fault is greater than the other's,
the court could interpret the contract as favorable to the party less at fault; similarly,
this all-or-nothing rule would be somewhat unjust.1°° The court could attempt to
interpret the disputed provision to have a meaning between the extreme of what
each party urges. Although more equitable, this would prove difficult in practice.
These possible solutions are obviously unworkable in many cases. The value of
many contracts is essentially all-or-nothing, with a partial or modified performance
little better than no performance.
There is a generally workable solution: the court could, upon a finding that
both parties' conduct was faulty under Article 2057, apply Article 1952 by analogy
to award damages and apply Article 2323 directly to reduce the damages awarded
to the party against whom the provision was interpreted, in proportion to that
party's fault. Indeed, Article 2323 states: "When contributory negligence is
applicable to a claim for damages ... the amount of damages recoverable shall be
reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence attributable to the
person suffering ... the loss." Thus, to give full effect to Article 2057, if both
parties are negligent, their negligence must be compared. The only feasible remedy
in such a case is to award damages, applying Article 1952 by analogy.' 0 '
Assuming that Article 2057 compares negligence, and Article 1952 awards
damages, Article 2323 demands that damages be apportioned by the degree of fault
or negligence. The resolution of the dispute or misunderstanding could then mirror
the reality of the situation, i.e., both parties bearing part of the burden their mutual
misunderstanding created.
The advisability of using this analysis largely turns on its effect on the stability
of transactions. The present rules are not manifestly unfair. Courts, when they
apply the articles informed by the rationale behind the law, place the burden of
disputes on the party most chargeable with the cause of the dispute. However, it
is hard to see how the proposed analysis will harm stability. When there is a
discoverable common will of the parties, it would be enforced. When one party
acted reasonably and the other negligently, the negligent party would bear the loss.

100. If this injustice at least promoted stability and predictability, it might be tolerable.
However, determining which party was more at fault is often speculative, and not readily susceptible
to extra-judicial resolution. The parties could compromise the question, but this says nothing
useful-they could compromise the whole dispute. If the parties subject the matter to judicial
resolution, an all-or-nothing rule is effectively a roll of the dice for the parties.
101. The article directly governs cases of rescission and damages related thereto. However, the
principle that the court should have wide discretion to protect the parties could also apply to cases
of contract construction.
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Neither party would be subjected to burdens except those which a reasonable
interpretation of the contract could have specified. The only difference is that,
when the court finds that both parties are at fault, the burden would be split between
them according to their fault. Neither party would have any liability greater than
what the law now imposes, but more equitable results would be achieved. With
identical maximum risks and less chance of an all-or-nothing result, the stability of
transactions should be improved.
VI. OTHER LAW TO BE CONSIDERED AND THE LESSONS LEARNED THEREFROM

A.

Historical Basesfor Error Analysis and the Revision of Obligations in 1984

Most of the contract provisions of the current Civil Code articles are rooted,
both in substance and in language, in older articles. The revision in 1984'02 made
some changes, but the older principles remain largely in tact. Thus, not only is the
meaning of the articles stable, but the jurisprudence is generally constant.
The provisions on error and rescission in Articles 1948-1952 are all new as
text, but most are old as law. 0 3 The most important change is that Article 1952
gives the court greater discretion on remedies when rescission is considered.
Previously the question was treated as one of rescission or not; if rescission was
granted no damages were awarded, but if the contract was upheld it was enforced
by its full terms." ° The court is now free to grant rescission, or not, and to award
damages, or not, to the party against whom the contract is upheld or against whom
rescission is granted, based on which remedy or combination of remedies will best
protect each party and serve justice.
Articles 2045-2057, regulating the interpretation of contracts, are based on
prior law.'t 5 Most of the articles do not change the law,'0 6 but those that
do-Articles 2053, 2054, and 2057-do so to limit judicial efforts to determine
meaning when the text is clear0 7 and, at the same time, clarify the rules of

102. The revision culminated in the enactment of the current Book IlI, Title III (Obligations in
General) and Title IV (Conventional Obligations or Contracts) of the Louisiana Civil Code by 1984
La. Acts No. 331, effective January 1, 1985.
103. The vices of consent listed in Article 1948--error, fraud, and duress-were found in
Articles 1819 (1870), 1813 (1825), and 9 (1808). Article 1949's requirement that, to vitiate consent,
an error must concern acause without which the party would not have contracted and which the other
party is aware of is based on Articles 1823, 1825, and 1826 (1870), Articles 1817, 1819, and 1820
(1825), and Article 10 (1808). The recognized types of error in the cause in Article 1950 come from
Articles 1824-1846 (1870) and various earlier provisions. The most significant changes occur in
Article.1952, but even it is based on prior law: Articles 1837 and 1839 (1870) and Articles 1831 and
1833 (1825). See La. Civ. Code Ann. Vol. 16, arts. 1819, 1823-1846 (1870) (West 1973).
104. La. Civ. Code art. 1952, cmt. (b).
105. See comments to La. Civ. Code arts. 2045-2052.
106. Id.
107. La. Civ. Code art. 2053, cmts. (a) and (b).
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interpretation. 0 8 Thus, the actual methods used to interpret contracts have not
changed very much.
The effect of the revision on the discussion above is generally slight, and the
rationale of the prior law is left intact. The major change affecting this discussion
comes in Article 1952, which greatly liberalizes the remedies available to the court.
Thus, it indicates a basic legislative intent consistent with the rationale of
comparative fault and damages discussed above.
B. ImplicationsandLimits ofErrorAnalysis
1. Stability of Contracts
The suggestion that error and fault concepts should be applied more frequently
in contract law can be disturbing because it might appear that their use would inject
uncertainty to a presently stable area of law. Some fear that the present set of
arguably simple rules of contract law would be replaced with a more nebulous
decision-making analysis. With respect to questions of rescission and construction,
this is clearly not so. If the Civil Code articles are applied as written when doing
so leads to no absurd results, the outcomes should be the same as are reached under
the prevailing methods because the rules of the Civil Code are typical contract
construction rules. When the articles cannot reasonably be applied as written,"
but their purpose is agreed on, if the articles are applied with a reference to this
purpose, the results in these cases should be more stable. The purpose is a
predictable fall-back reference to be considered after the text is consulted. To the
extent this purpose is ascertainable and agreed on, all can use it to evaluate
contractual disputes.
Comparing the fault of the parties should be reserved for those exceptional
cases in which both parties carried on their business in a clearly careless manner.
In almost any case it would be possible to construct a theory under which either
party, by acting more cautiously, could have prevented the contractual misunderstanding. Although the law should not require this extreme degree of care, when
both parties' conduct was clearly deficient, the best way to achieve a just result may
be to compare the fault of the parties and order remedies accordingly. In cases in
which both parties' conduct led to a misunderstanding, an all-or-nothing scheme
like the presently prevailing one makes predicting outcomes and valuing settlements largely a matter of luck. It cannot be said that such a scheme promotes
stability. Furthermore, in time litigants will be able to evaluate the worth of their
claims by comparing them to similar, previously decided cases. Tort cases are
frequently handled this way today."'

108. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., the example supra at part IV-C.
110. When the Supreme Court adopted comparative fault for maritime collision cases, rejecting
the old rule of "divided damages" (an equal share of damages was assessed to each party at fault),
it stated,
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2. Restrictionsin the Civil Code'sScheme?
It might be suggested that the Louisiana Civil Code creates two.' distinct
vices of consent-error and fraud-and that these are purposefully separated.
According to this view, any attempt to examine the fault of the parties which
consists of more than error but less than fraud is unauthorized. However, Article
3506(13) states: "The gross fault is that which proceeds from inexcusable
negligence or ignorance; it is considered as nearly equal to fraud." Given that many
courts have refused to grant rescission for unilateral errors which they deemed
"inexcusable,""' 2 it seems there is at least a tacit recognition that error and fraud
are not two completely separate concepts, but rather overlap in some cases.
An example of overlap of error and fraud occurred in Fullerv. Barattini,
where Mr. Barattini leased a shop to Mr. Fuller after having assured him, first, that
he (Barattini) would get Fuller permits to operate a lounge on the premises, and
second, that ample parking would be available on adjacent lots which Barattini
purportedly controlled. After Fuller signed the lease, Barattini attempted,
unsuccessfully, to use his political connections to secure the necessary permits and
to gain control of the parking areas, which he did not then own or lease. Because
Barattini had misrepresented several facts, there was a two-year delay before the
lounge could open. After further troubles, Fuller sued for rescission of the lease.
The court held that, although the defendant's conduct was highly blameworthy, it
did not meet the legal requirement of fraud.' '4 The court stated:
This article [Louisiana Civil Code article 1953] requires not only that
there be a misrepresentation, but also that the misrepresentation be made
with the "intention" of gaining an unjust advantage .... The record
indicates that Barattini honestly believed that through his political contacts
he could readily acquire the needed permits. ...In none of this did he
intend to take advantage of Fuller."'

Experience with comparative negligence in the personal injury area teaches that a rule of
fairness in court will produce fair out-of-court settlements ....(Clomparative negligence
does not appear to discourage the negotiation of settlements .... (Olfthe marine personal
injury cases involving a federal question that were terminated in the fiscal year 1974, only
9.6% ever reached trial.
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 & n.13, 95 S.Ct. 1708, 1714 & n.13
(1975). Adopting comparative fault in contract cases may similarly lead to an increase in the pre-trial
settlement of such cases.
111.
Duress is also a vice of consent, La. Civ. Code art. 1948, but consideration of it is not very
helpful to this discussion.
112. The first case stating this rule is Wikoff v. Townsend, 7 Mart. (o.s.) 451 (La. 1820). See
also, e.g., Shreveport Great Empire Broadcasters, Inc. v. Chicoine, 528 So. 2d 633, 637 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1988).
113. 574 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991).
114. Id. at 416.
115. Id.

19931

COMMENTS

1905

The court held that rescission was proper for error and awarded Fuller the expenses
he incurred remodeling the6 premises, but attorney's fees were not awarded because
there had been no fraud."
C. OtherLaws with Comparative Fault
Interestingly, the Louisiana Legislature has recently passed measures which
provide for comparative fault determinations in a limited contractual setting.
Additionally, federal law already does so in some circumstances. This indicates
that the legislatures have determined that the use of comparative fault to decide
contractual disputes will not destroy contract law.
The Louisiana Legislature recently adopted revised provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code article on Bank Deposits and Collections." 7 One provision of
the new law regulates the "[c]ustomer's duty to discover and report unauthorized
signature[s] or alteration[s]."" 8 According to this provision:
If the bank proves that the customer failed.., to comply with the duties
imposed on the customer .... [A]nd the customer proves that the bank
failed to exercise ordinary care ... and that the failure substantially
contributed to the loss, the loss is allocated between the customer.., and
the bank.., according to the extent to which the failure[s] ... contributed
to the loss." 9
The Uniform Commercial Code section's official comment explicitly states that the
court should apply comparative negligence principles."2 ° Moreover, other
sections of the newly adopted law, which govern commercial paper, require similar
results.12 ' Although these provisions are limited in scope and are not part of the

116. There are other cases in which a vendor or lessor of immovable property made
misrepresentations short of fraud to the vendee or lessee. In these cases, the courts frequently granted
both rescission and damages to the misled party. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bussiere. 284 So. 2d 892 (La.
1973) and Guaranty Say. Assurance Co. v. Uddo, 386 So. 2d 670 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1980).
Moreover, misrepresentations short of fraud occur in other contexts. See. e.g., First Acadiana Bank
v. Bollich, 532 So. 2d 248 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (considering effect of contract written as
continuing guarantee for loans but intended and requested as guaranty of only two notes).
117. 1992 La. Acts No. 1133 adopted, with certain modifications not at issue here, many revised
sections of U.C.C. article 4 as portions of La. R.S. 10:4. The effective date of these revisions is July
1, 1993.
118. La. R.S. 10:4-406, as amended by 1992 La. Acts No. 1133 (effective July 1. 1993).
119. La. R.S. 10:4-406(d)-(e), as amended by 1992 La. Acts No. 1133 (effective July 1, 1993).
120. U.C.C. § 4-406, cmt. 4 (1990) states that "[slubsection (e) replaces former subsection (3)
and poses a modified comparative negligence test for determining liability.'
121. La. R.S. 10:3-404 to 3-406, as amended by 1992 La. Acts No. 1133 (effective July 1,
1993). See also William D. Hawkland, 1992 Revisions to Chapters 3 and 4 and the New Chapter
4A of the Uniform Commercial Code (1992) (unpublished materials for the author's continuing legal
education class), explaining that, for U.C.C. § 3-406 (1990). "the result of negligence is put on a
comparative, rather than absolute, basis where both the issuer of the instrument and a subsequent
holder or other person have been negligent." Id. at 13.
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general contract law of the Civil Code, they do provide for comparative fault
damage valuation in contractual settings, namely, banking and other lending.
Federal law also provides for comparative fault damage valuation in maritime
contractual settings. For example, Coastal Iron Works, Inc. v. Petty Ray
Geophysical 22 concerned liability for a fire on a ship which Coastal had been
repairing for Petty Ray. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the trial
court that the fire was due to the concurrent causes of the shipyard's negligence in
performing the repairs (assessed at 75%) and the shipowner's negligence in failing
to discover or report the highly flammable materials on the ship (assessed -at
25%). t2 ' Although the court characterized the shipowner as a "tort plaintiff,"
such a characterization is incorrect, at least in that the court's theory of recovery
was the warranty of workmanlike performance implicitly given by the shipyard to
the shipowner.' 4 This is clearly a contract-law basis for the decision, whether
or not the court characterized it as such. 12 5 A warranty is a promise, actual or
implied, 126 and thus any action or decision based on a warranty is contractu127
al.
In these examples, a comparative fault rule determines the damages for a
breach of a contract. 22 The court examines the conduct of the parties and decides
the case based on how much of the difficulty it finds each party is responsible for;
the result depends on the respective fault of the parties. Implicit in this is the
determination that there exists a contract of fixed or agreed-upon meaning to be
breached. If comparative fault is a beneficial rule when a contract definitely exists,
it should be even more applicable when no such contract of agreed-upon meaning
exists, in which case the matter is more analogous to a tort or a quasi-contract. 29

122. 783 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1986).
123. Id. at 582.
124. Id. at 583.
125. The fault allocation did not affect the final award because the damages attributable to the
shipyard's fault were greater than a contractual limitation of liability which the court upheld. Id.
126. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1586 (6th ed. 1990).
127. Before the modem expansion of tort law into areas like products liability, suits for injuries
caused by defective products could only be brought by the purchaser against the manufacturer
because only he enjoyed the "privity of contract" and the related warranties. See, e.g., W. Page
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 96,at 681 (5th ed. 1984). Warranties were
the result of a contract, not a general duty to the public. Although now there is a recognized duty
to protect the public, such duty does not give rise to any warranty. The duty is independent from
any warranty; the warranty, being contractual or quasi-contractual, requires an affirmative act, but the
duty does not, and thus the duty does not arise from a warranty.
128. The breach is based on general requirement of conscientious performance theories or
explicit contractual provisions.
129. However, according to the "objective" theory of contracts, the acts and not the will of the
parties are important. The parties' belief about the contract is irrelevant. Thus, both the existence
and the effects of acontract depend solely on objective factors, i.e., what have the parties done? This
answered, it is a relatively simple matter to determine what the contract required (if anything) by
judging the parties' actions. See, e.g., supra note 20. Of course, the objective theory does not
account for possible multiple causes of damages under the contract.
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Nevertheless, in some limited contractual settings comparative fault principles are
already in effect, and the law has not suffered.
D. Some Scenariosfor Consideration
Suppose a high school desired to procure entertainment for a school dance.
The students, acting through their student council, are given the basic authority to
choose the musical entertainment, but a faculty advisor has the ultimate authority
to approve or deny any proposal. The students decide to hire a disc jockey instead
of a live band, select one, and get a contract for the faculty advisor's approval and
signing (the advisor being the only representative of the school with legal capacity
to contract). Even though the faculty advisor is given a brochure describing the
disc jockey's services, he signs the contract without even realizing that he has
engaged a disc jockey-not a live band. When the principal and the advisor
discover this, they attempt to rescind the contract for error.
Several questions arise. What are the causes which may vitiate the advisor's
consent? Are the students' principal causes controlling, or are the advisor's? Did
the disc jockey know of the principal causes? Was the advisor's error inexcusable?
Perhaps the principal cause was to procure musical entertainment for the dance.
Perhaps, at least as far as the advisor was concerned, the principal cause was to
procure a band for the dance. The disc jockey may have thought that the advisor's
approval would be essentially a formality and that the students' wishes were
controlling, or he may have thought that the advisor would have his own say based
on his own criteria. The advisor may have neglected to review information readily
available to him or have been misled by information which would be unclear to
someone who does not frequently hire musical entertainment.
Because the school or school board is the true contracting party, the consent
of its agent, the advisor, is the consent at issue. If the advisor can prove that he
would not have contracted, under any circumstances, with a disc jockey instead of
a band, then having a band should be a cause which, if affected by error, could
vitiate the consent. However, if the advisor would have considered having a disc
jockey under some circumstances, then this cause would not subject the contract to
rescission. The question raised is: Would the matter affected by the error
automatically have dissuaded the party in error from contracting, if he had known
the truth?
If the advisor discussed "musical entertainment" with the disc jockey, then the
disc jockey would have had no reason to know that the advisor expected a band;
however, if the advisor discussed "live entertainment" for the dance, then the disc
jockey should have been put on notice that the advisor may well have expected a
band. The questions are: Was the party not in error reasonably appaised of the
other party's main expectations from the contract? Did he attempt to accommodate
the party in error when contracting? The advisor's error may well be inexcusable.
If he had the opportunity to inquire about the exact nature of the entertainment or
was given a brochure describing the disc jockey service but failed to read it, then
his own negligence should prevent the rescission he seeks. The next question is:
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Did the party in error act with the care of a reasonable person, given all the
circumstances? Although these questions all turn on factual issues, they serve to
illustrate the considerations
which arise in an action for rescission of a contract for
30
unilateral error.
Error can also affect the parties' understanding of the meaning of their
contract. Suppose a husband and wife, desiring to have a new house built, solicit
bids for building a house according to their general specifications. Ultimately the
couple accepts a proposal that includes an exact cost figure. While the house is
being built, the couple requests certain changes to the house, which the contractor
agrees to make for an agreed-to, specified price. When the house is complete, a
dispute arises concerning the exact price the couple must pay the contractor. The
contractor alleges that the contract was on a "cost plus" basis, so the price is
determined by adding a fixed fee to the cost of construction, while the couple
alleges that the contract was for a fixed, all-inclusive price. The contractor sues for
an unpaid balance allegedly due.
Relevant inquiries may include: Did the contractor make it known that the
contract was on a cost plus basis? Did the contractor explain what pricing
alternatives were used in the construction industry? Did the couple adequately
convey how much extra they were willing to pay for the changes they requested?
Did they inquire what the full price would be, given the alterations? One could
argue that if a given method of pricing was predominant in the construction
industry, such a method should be presumed absent a clear contrary intention. On
the other hand, it could be argued that because most contracts are for a fixed price,
such a price should be presumed unless another price is specified.
Both parties to the contract have a duty to make clear what they understand the
contract to require. If the couple explained to the contractor that they wanted to be
told a specific price for which the contractor would build the house, then absent the
contractor's refusal to work for such a price, the contract should be construed as a
fixed-cost contract. If, on the other hand, the contractor explained that the price
estimate was composed of two elements, cost and profit, and correctly gave a
revised cost, not including profit, when the couple requested changes in the house,
then the contract should be construed as a cost-plus contract. If neither party
adequately explained what was expected or desired, and no usage or understanding
can be truly understood as the common or prevailing one, then comparative fault
should be applied. Both parties failed to use the degree of care the law requires, so
each should be liable for part of the difference in the alleged contract prices. If the
court found that the contractor was 65% at fault and the couple 35% at fault, and
the difference in the prices was $5,000, then the couple should have to pay an
additional 35% of the difference, or $1,750 above what they understood to be the
3

price.1 1

130. These facts are adapted from and an extension of Hebert v.Livingston Parish School Board,
438 So. 2d 1141 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
131.
Maxwell v. Bernard, 343 So. 2d 431 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), provided the basis for this
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VII. CONCLUSION
Some contractual situations would benefit from an updated theoretical
approach. The proposed rule is that when the court cannot determine with any
reasonable degree of certainty what the parties actually intended or what their
contract objectively means, the court should attempt to resolve the dispute by
considering the parties' respective fault causing the misunderstanding. Although
this rule is more of a synthesis and distillation of existing principles of Louisiana
law than a radical precept, some seem reluctant to accept what is already woven in
the fabric of the law.
For example, the entire question of whether a contract exists depends on issues
of possible errors in any principal cause 32 of the contract. If one party is in error
on such a cause and the other is aware of the importance of this cause, the court
may grant rescission. In deciding whether to grant rescission, the court should
consider the origin(s) of the error. Indeed, Louisiana courts have based rescission
decisions on whether the error was excusable, negligent, or induced by the other
33
party for over 150 years.
Moreover, in many cases the only way to use the Civil Code's contract
interpretation articles properly is to apply them while considering that they seek to
allocate the costs of a contractual misunderstanding to the party who created it.
Any narrow attempt to apply these rules literally can only cause inconsistent results
and thus instability in the law.'"
Of course, ifthe court actually reaches the stage of resolving a contract dispute
based on the comparative fault of the parties, it may be difficult for it to provide
proper remedies. One may debate whether the present Civil Code articles provide
for comparative fault damages, but several cases" 35 have already fashioned
remedies similar to those which would be necessary under a comparative fault cost
allocation. Moreover, increasing the court's flexibility to provide other than all-ornothing remedies should further enhance the stability of transactions in the long run
by allowing parties to value potential disputes and claims by other than a simple
win-or-lose standard.
The validity and value of this approach are already subject to scrutiny because
Louisiana law currently recognizes the role of comparative fault in a few limited
contractual settings.' 6 If our contract law is not destroyed by these inroads,
scenario. In that case the court found that the contractor had not explained or even made any
significant mention of cost-plus pricing, so the misunderstanding was due entirely to the contractor's
lack of necessary explanation, and the homeowners were entitled to the lower price. For another case
in which a contractor was held responsible for a misunderstanding caused by its lack of explanation,
see Leithman v. Dolphin Swimming Pool Co., 252 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
132. For an explanation of the technicalities of the "principal" cause requirement, see supra part
111-A and accompanying notes.
133. See, e.g., cases discussed supra at part Ill-C-2.
134. See supra part IV.
135. See, e.g., cases discussed supra in part VI-B-2.
136. See supra part VI-C.
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presumably it can survive these modest proposals for making more definite and
explicit the role of error and fault in the contractual arena. This would not be an
unheard of step and it is arguably permissible under the present Civil Code articles.
Perhaps the more important question concerns how the proposed rules would affect
those who depend on contract law. If the present proposal is followed by Louisiana
courts, contracting parties would be well served by a more stable and just contract
law.
David E. Redmann, Jr.

